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Political Economy in Tradable Emissions Permits
http://hdl.handle.net/11266/5889
http://hdl.handle.net/11266/5889530f980d-7341-4715-9a18-3113850be170
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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[059-078].pdf (620.0 kB)
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2017-05-23 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Political Economy in Tradable Emissions Permits | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Tradable Emission Permits, Political Economy | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
著者 |
Kawahara, Shinya
× Kawahara, Shinya× 河原, 伸哉 |
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抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | This paper examines how a politically-motivated government can behave in a domestic emissions trading scheme within a simple political economy framework. By constructing a model in which the amount of emissions cap and the distribution of emissions permits (grandfathering system or auction system) are endogenously determined, we show that a corruptible government issues inefficient amounts of emissions cap to benefit its preferable group. In particular, a pro-industry government issues too large amount of emissions cap to reduce its price, which benefits an industry group. A pro-environment government issues too small amount of emissions cap to reduce pollution emissions, which benefits an environmental group. Then, we examine how an incumbent government decides the distribution of initial permits if it will be replaced in the future by a government with a different objective. In particular, we show that a pro-welfare government which will be replaced by a corruptible government in the future chooses grandfathering system to make the amount of emissions cap chosen in the future more efficient. | |||||
書誌情報 |
経済学季報 巻 65, 号 3/4, p. 59-78, 発行日 2016-03-31 |
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ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 02883457 | |||||
出版タイプ | ||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 立正大学経済学会 |